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2Abstract
Sassen’s identification of global cities as ‘strategic places’ is explored throughworld city network analysis. This involves searching out advanced producerservice (APS) firms that constitute ‘strategic networks’, from whose activitiesstrategic places can be defined. Twenty-five out of 175 APS firms are found to bestrategic, and from their office networks, 45 cities out of 526 are designated asstrategic places. A measure of ‘strategicness’ of cities is devised, and individualfindings from this are discussed by drawing on existing literature about how APSfirms use specific cities. A key finding shows that New York and London havedifferent levels of strategicness, and this is related to the former’s innovationprowess and the latter’s role in global consumption of services. Other cases ofstrategicness discussed in terms of the balance between production andconsumption of APSs are Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai; Palo Alto; MexicoCity; Johannesburg; and Dubai and Frankfurt.
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3Introduction
In her classic The Global City Sassen (1991, 3-4) identified, as her ‘point ofdeparture’, processes of globalization that had ‘created a new strategic role formajor cities’ resulting in a ‘new type of city’ that ‘is the global city’. In hersubsequent textbook on the subject, she distinguished global cities as one ofthree types of ‘strategic places’ (Sassen 1994, 18) – later extended to four(Sassen 2006, 31) – but her discussion makes clear that it is global cities that areby far the most important strategic places in economic globalization. The primepurpose of this article is to investigate cities as strategic places in contemporaryglobalization using the methodology developed as world city network analysis(Taylor 2001, 2004; Taylor et al. 2011). This approach deals with many morecities than Sassen considers: here we ask the question, which of these numerouscities can be reasonably identified as strategic places? We deploy world citynetwork analysis findings to answer this question quantitatively so that amongstthe cities thus identified we can measure degrees of ‘strategicness’. From this weexplore different ways in which cities are being strategic, drawing on theliterature dealing with selected individual cities.
We treat the concept of strategic places as a specific expression of Sheppard’s(2002) geographic positionality within globalization. One of the examples hedraws on in his broad discussion of positionality is the ‘status’ of cities beingdefined ‘by their position within transnational networks’ so that ‘one can seethat the role and trajectory of such cities is bound up with their positionality’(Sheppard, 2002, 324). In arguing that ‘[o]ur understanding of the spatiality ofglobalization will be impoverished … if positionality is neglected’ (Sheppard,2002, 319), Sheppard lists several advantages of this approach, two of which areparticularly relevant to our study of strategic places. First, there is the matter ofmutuality across networks: the role of the nonlocal in constituting all local placeswhatever the scale of definition – the conditions for change depend on ‘directinteractions with distant places’ and not just ‘local initiative’ (Sheppard, 2002,319). Second, this same mutuality, which is the essence of network building, canlead researchers away from considering the ‘unequal power relations’
4(Sheppard, 2002, 319) that also inhabit networks – all nodes are equal but someare more equal (strategic) than others. This fits neatly with our world citynetwork analysis where it is advanced producer service (APS) firms that are theglobal network-makers, and it is their urban agglomeration that creates Sassen’sglobal cities. Thus, what is strategic has to be treated from two directions. Fromthe perspective of cities, there are key firms that operate as strategic networks,which cities need to be part of; but equally, from the perspective of firms, thereare key cities that are strategic places, where firms have to be. Thus, ourargument will bring together Castells’ (1996) spaces of flows and spaces ofplaces into a single analysis and interpretation.
We build this analysis and interpretation on the foundations provided byliteratures documenting the internationalization of advanced producer servicefirms such as accounting, advertising, architecture, finance, and law (Bagchi-Senand Sen 1997; Bryson, Daniels, and Warf 2004; Daniels 1993; Faulconbridge,Hall, and Beaverstock 2008; Jones 2002). This literature details the way firms’policies target particular city spaces as part of efforts to construct coordinationcapabilities that support both markets exploitation/development and innovationpriorities. As such, strategic cities are the sites through which APS firms can bothdeploy but also develop their core competencies; this mutual relationship beingat the heart of agglomeration and localization processes that define the cluster-like economies of world cities (Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2004; Cook et al.2007; Faulconbridge et al. 2011). By connecting questions of city strategicness tothe location policies of internationalizing APS firms, we do not, however, aspireto match the subtle and nuanced treatment of positionality that Sheppardachieves, but we do attempt to provide a distinct empirical contribution to thediscussion based on the foundations of the literature on the internationalizationpolicies of APS firms: a strongly-evidenced, theoretically-sound set of results thatdo add something new to understanding cities in globalization. Our argumentproceeds in seven parts: (1) we present the basic model that we use, whichspecifies contemporary intercity relations as an interlocking network; (2) weoutline the connections between the location policies of internationalizing APSfirms and the production of strategic city places; (3) we describe the data
5required to operationalize the model by creating a service values matrix showinghow firms use cities, and initial forms of analyses from these data are describedfor both firms and cities; (4) specific findings for 2010 data are presenteddescribing city-dyad contrasts and globalization strategies of firms; (5) strategicnetworks are derived from the globalization strategies, and these are employedto identify strategic places; (6) the strategicness of cities is derived by relatingstrategic network positions to cities’ encompassing global network positions;and (7) we interpret our findings in relation to what the literature says about anumber of specific cities we have found to be strategic places. What we thus addto the world city network literature is a comprehensive assessment of cities inthis category. Our most notable finding concerns London and New York. Thesetwo cities dominate world city rankings and are often functionally linkedtogether as ‘NYLON’. Not surprisingly, both figure as strategic places in thisstudy, but we are able to separate them in terms of ‘strategicness’: we willdisentangle NYLON within the overall framework of the world city network.
APS Internationalization through Strategic Cities
Since the seminal work on the role of APSs in the global economy (Beyers 1992;Daniels 1993, 1995; Enderwick 1989), debates about the strategic role of citieshave been at the forefront of concerns. Originally centered around questionsabout why APS firms cluster in cities, and spurning extensive analysis of the waycity economies function using agglomeration and localization logics and theirexplanations of markets and innovation processes, respectively (Pryke 1994;Grabher 2001; Cook et al. 2007; Faulconbridge et al., 2011), this literature hasdeveloped in the past decade since studies of the varying roles cities play infirms’ strategies have come to the fore (Beaverstock 2007; Faulconbridge et al.2007, 2008, 2011; Jones 2002; McNeill 2008; Warf 2001). In this regard, Bagchi-Sen and Sen (1997) were ahead of their time when they deployed Dunning andNorman’s (1983) eclectic paradigm to analyse the location advantages for APS ofdifferent cities. In this work, the ‘size and character of the market; regulation ofmarkets; … and the location of human (skilled labor) and physical assets’ were
6identified as core factors influencing where internationalizing APS chose toestablish foreign outposts (Bagchi-Sen and Sen 1997, 1158). However, even atthis early stage of research, it was noted that ‘sector differentiation in terms ofinternationalization strategies’ (Bagchi-Sen and Sen 1997, 1171) was crucial,accounting and advertising being compared and contrasted by Bagchi-Sen andSen (1997).
Further inspired by calls to open the black box used to represent firms and theirstrategies in studies of corporations driving economic globalization (Taylor andAsheim 2001; Yeung 2005), the most recent research on APSinternationalization, therefore, seeks to identify (1) groups of firms that sharecommon strategic objectives and (2) the differing role of cities in fulfilling theseobjectives. In relation to issue (1), it is possible to distinguish between whatmight be called the ubiquitous presence versus the strategic presence approach.The former, most commonly adopted by the Big Four accounting firms(Beaverstock 1996), major financial institutions (Wójcik 2011) and hybridproducer-consumer services, such as temporary staffing agencies (Coe, Johns,and Ward 2007), involves maintaining a presence in as many cities as possible soas to allow revenue maximization through the servicing of local clients’ needs.The latter, associated more with advertising (Faulconbridge et al. 2011),architecture (McNeill 2008), and law firms (Faulconbridge 2008), is driven by adesire to locate offices in the most strategically important places, strategicimportance being defined in terms of both the global influence andconnectedness of markets and the extent to which work in these places is cuttingedge in terms of innovation and thus global profile. Similar variations in strategyare also noted by Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen (2013) in their analysis of thelocation strategies of Japanese multinationals (including but not limited to APS),with only certain firms prioritizing location in strategic world cities.
Connected to debates about internationalization strategy and the more or lessstrategic role of different places are also questions about the organizational formof APS. For instance, Faulconbridge et al. (2008) synthesize a range of researchon APS and apply it to the case of executive search to reveal that depending on
7the strategic importance of a city, alongside regulatory constraints and issues ofinstitutional distance, internationalization may involve: owned offices(traditional foreign direct investment); the establishment of networks(collaboration with local independent APS rather than direct investment); or ahybrid of the two former approaches (investment in already existing local APSwho retain some autonomy but become tightly integrated into global corporatenetworks). While there is some variability, particularly when regulatory barriersrestrict the activities of foreign companies in a market as has been the case inIndia and China for many APS, owned strategies tend to be associated with themost strategically important sites, while networks are used to provide presencewhen needed in markets that are uncertain in terms of regulatory barriers,stability, or strategic importance. Hybrids allowed midranking city nodes, whichare integrated into global economic flows but in less strategic ways, to beeffectively served. The example of the executive search firm Korn/Ferry given byFaulconbridge et al. (2008) is illustrative of such connections betweenorganizational form and the strategicness of a city. Owned offices dominate thefirm’s internationalization strategy, which involves presence in a total of over 70cities. However, the owned approach is restricted to the most strategic locationssuch as London, New York, Frankfurt etc. Hybrid forms are used in locations thathave less strategic importance, for instance in Mexico City and Monterey, whilenetworks allow a flag to be planted in locations of potential future importance(e.g., Johannesburg) or where a token presence is required but markets arelimited (e.g., Auckland).
The APS literature reveals, then, two important insights relevant to the analysisand interpretation of the way cities do or do not become strategic places in theworld city network created by APS firms. First, it shows that not all APS firmshave the same significance when presence or absence is being used as a proxy ofstrategicness. The ubiquitous presence strategy means that sectors, such asaccounting and finance, potentially maintain a presence in both more and lessstrategic cities. Hence, we expect most firms in these sectors not to be evident inmeasures of strategicness. Meanwhile, firms in other sectors that adopt astrategic presence approach will likely be more conspicuous in analyses seeking
8proxies for city strategicness. Second, the APS literature also reveals that while afirm may have tens or hundreds of offices, not all of these offices share an equallevel of strategic importance. Variations in strategicness may be reflected in theorganizational form used to manage presence but also in other characteristicssuch as size and staffing. With these insights in mind, the remainder of the articleconsiders how such understandings of variations in the strategic role of cities inAPS internationalization might be both captured in world city network analysismethodologies and used to understand the urban spatial architecture of current-day global capitalism.
Basic Model: Interlocking Network Specification
To deploy the insights gained from the APS literature, it is important to considertheir implications for the assumptions in the interlocking network model used inworld city network analysis. To do this, we begin by briefly reprising the model’skey premises. Our first premise is that cities are formed through commercialrelations with other cities (Jacobs 1969), and that these intercity relationscompose networks (Taylor, Hoyler, and Verbruggen 2010). As the products ofcommerce, generic city networks are specified as interlocking networks. Thistype of network has an unusual formation in that it operates through three levelsinstead of two. As well as the net and node levels common to all networks, it hasa third ‘sub-nodal’ level. This is its vital property for understanding commercialcity networks because it is at the sub-nodal level that we find the agents of thenetworking process: connections between a firm’s offices in different cities arethe basis of network making. In identifying these agents we avoid reifying citiesas economic agents: it is firms that create city networks by their everyday workthrough multiple locations. Therefore, city networks encompass the net level atthe scale of the economy the cities operate in, the node level as cities, and a sub-nodal level as multilocation firms. In the specific case of the contemporary worldcity network, these are the global economy; important cities across the worldincluding Sassen’s global cities; and leading APS firms (Taylor 2001).
9The choice of specifying APS firms as the economic agents making the world citynetwork derives directly from Sassen’s (1991) identification of this economicsector as a key creator of her global cities. This occurs in two ways. First, globalcities through their ‘control and command functions’ house corporateheadquarters and agencies of government that provide the main market forAPSs. Second, it is these cities that are the production centers for APSs, the placeswhere product and process innovations keep growing this cutting edge economicsector. This consumption/production dual character of global cities will have acentral role in interpreting the strategic places we identify below. However, wedepart from Sassen’s use of APSs to identify a small subset of cities as ‘global’ andinstead recognize that APSs are much more widespread than her discussionimplies. We define a world city network based upon the activities of APS firmsthat encompass several hundred cities across the world. This reflects the factthat economic globalization is an all-encompassing process; there are no ‘un-global cities’, just variations in the form and intensity of global processes acrossdifferent cities based largely on a city’s historical trajectory and contemporarypositionality. Thus, we specify the world city network in terms of the worldwideoffice networks of leading APS firms.
The world city network is formally specified in Taylor (2001); here we providethe basic outline. The network is represented by a city-by-firm matrix Vij, wherevi,j is the ‘service value’ of city i to firm j. This service value is a standardizedmeasure of the importance of a city to a firm’s office network, which depends onthe size and functions of a firm’s office(s) in a city.
The intercity connectivity between two cities a and i (ICCa-i) is defined as1
1 It is in principle possible to generate two different networks based on the datameasuring the presence of firms in cities: a firm-to-firm network and a city-to-citynetwork (Neal 2008; Liu and Derudder, 2012). As our interest is primarily in identifyingwell-connected cities through firms’ location strategies, our focus here – as in mostworld city network analyses - is on the city networks.
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ICCa-i = ∑ va,j . vi,j (where a ≠ i) (1)
This provides a measure of the potential work flows, transfers of informationand knowledge, between pairs of cities. The assumption behind conceiving theproduct of service values as a surrogate for actual flows between cities a and i forfirm j is that the more important the office, the more links there will be withother offices in a firm’s network. In other words, we are using a simpleinteraction relation as our measure of connectivity: two cities housing largeoffices will generate more intercity work flows between them than two citieseach with small offices.
Typically in world city network analysis, these intercity connectivities areaggregated for each city, and the totals are interpreted as the global networkconnectivity of a city (GNC), indicating a city’s overall importance within thenetwork:
GNCa = ∑ ICCa-i (where a ≠ i) (2)
This has been the main measure derived from the model and can be interpretedas how well a city is integrated into the world city network, and hence its ‘globalstatus’.
Basic Data: Filling the Service Values Matrix
To operationalize this model requires assessment of firms’ office networks toempirically construct a city-by-firm matrix Vij of service values. The datarequired for this exercise are readily available on firms’ websites where theypromote their ‘global’ status as a means of both impressing clients in acompetitive services market and recruiting graduates in a competitive jobsmarket. However, this source, plus supplementary information as available,produces different levels and types of information for every firm. Thus for eachfirm, the data have to be converted by using a simple coding system to enable
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cross-firm comparison for analysis. We use a coding from 0 to 5, whereby in theservice values vi,j, 0 indicates a city where firm j has no presence and 5 is firm j’sheadquarter city. Codes 1 to 4 are then allocated as follows: a typical office offirm j scores a city 2; there must be something deficient to lower the score to 1,and something extra for it to rise above 2. For the latter, an especially large officescores 3, an office with extracity jurisdictions (e.g., regional HQ) scores 4. Eachfirm is assessed individually to decide on boundary decisions away from 2. With
n firms and m cities, such data collection creates an n firms x m cities array ofservice values, the basic matrix for interlocking network analysis. Each column ofthe matrix shows a firm’s location strategy as a string of integers from 0 to 5across m cities; each row shows a city’s service mix as a string from 0 to 5 across
n firms.
In 2010, we assessed the office networks of 175 firms across 526 cities. Theformer consisted of 75 financial services firms and 25 each of accounting,advertising, law, and management consulting firms. Firms were chosen usingtrade information that ranked the firms by size, based on the latest informationavailable (e.g., on turnover). Cities were chosen on the basis of previousexperience in this work (315 cities used in earlier data collections) plus all othercities with a population of more than 2 million, all other capital cities of countrieswith a population over 1 million, and all other cities housing the headquarters ofone of our 175 firms. These are arbitrary rules of inclusion, but the aim was toinclude more cities than necessary (526 in all) so as not to exclude anypotentially relevant cities in what is a very dynamic process of world citynetwork formation. The end result is a 175 firms x 526 cities matrix for 2010providing 92,050 service values for analysis.
Specific Findings for 2010: City-dyad Analysis and Globalization Strategies
There are two findings from analyses of these 2010 data that have stimulated thecurrent article. One concerns a city-dyad analysis that focuses on the intercityconnectivities as defined in equation (1) (Taylor et al. 2013a). The other is a
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principal components analysis of the service values matrix treating firms’location strategies as the input, using 175 variables (Taylor et al. 2013b). For fulldetails of these analyses, readers are referred to the original papers as noted;here we highlight specific findings that will directly feed into how we understandstrategic networks and strategic places in subsequent analysis.
In any city-dyad analysis of a large matrix such as ours, there are myriad pairs ofcities whose intercity connectivities can be computed as given in equation (1).The initial way of dealing with this surfeit of results is to concentrate on just thelargest connectivities: in this case, only the leading 40 city-dyad connectivitiesare considered. In Table 1 the number of times each of the top 20 cities, asdefined by global network connectivity (equation (2)), features in the leadingintercity connectivities is listed. For instance, New York appears in more top 40city-dyads than any other city – 10 times in all. Because global networkconnectivity is composed of intercity connectivities (equation (2)), there will bea broad relation between overall global network connectivity and the number ofleading city-dyads a city belongs to. For instance, it can be seen that there areseven out of these 20 cities that do not feature at all in the leading city-dyads byintercity connectivities, and these are generally found in the lower ranks ofglobal network connectivity in Table 1. But this relation is far from beingdefinitive. Dubai has no partners in top 40 city-dyads despite being ranked ninthfor global network connectivity. In stark contrast, Frankfurt, ranked a lowlynineteenth for global network connectivity, is a member of seven such city-dyads, which puts it only just behind Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai. Whatcan this mean?
In such circumstances, it is often the exceptions to the rule that are particularlyinformative, and this is what makes the Dubai/Frankfurt comparison sointriguing. A city’s global network connectivity is an aggregate measure that tellsus nothing about the specific intercity connections that constitute it: how manyconnections it is composed of (i.e., the number of other cities it shares firmswith), which cities it is more strongly connected to, and where it is relativelyweakly connected. Thus, what appears to be happening with Dubai’s global
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network connectivity is that it is composed of a relatively dispersed pattern ofintercity connectivities featuring more less-important cities than expected for itsglobal network connectivity ranking. Frankfurt, on the other hand, tends to havea more concentrated pattern of intercity connections constituting its globalnetwork connectivity, particularly featuring other major cities. Our preliminaryinterpretation is to link this to these cities’ – in Sheppard’s (2002) terms –positionalities in the world city network: Frankfurt has a more strategic positionwithin the world city network than Dubai, despite the fact that the latter is moregenerally integrated into the network. It was this train of thought that stimulatedus to consider how we could extrapolate from this particular finding andmeasure the strategicness of cities more generally. To go down this researchpath requires us to examine the network-makers, the firms whose officenetworks lie behind the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast and indeed otherdiscrepancies in the relation between global network connectivity andmembership in the top 40 city-dyads displayed in Table 1.
The second study we draw upon concerns analysis of APS firms’ office networksas location strategies. Obviously every firm considers its products and theirmarkets when deciding to invest the capital to set up a new office in another city.Thus, the outcome of these decisions at any one point in time constitutes a firm’slocation strategy. This particular geography is represented by a firm’s column ofintegers in the service values matrix; for 2010 we have 175 such strategies.Although every strategy is different across our firms, there are some clearsimilarities amongst them that can be teased out using a principal componentsanalysis. This technique is a ‘data reduction’ method that converts x variablesinto y components where y is appreciably smaller than x. This is achieved byusing the correlations between variables to combine them into groups of likevariables, the ‘principal components’ of the data. The importance of eachcomponent is derived from its correlations (called loadings) with the originalvariables. In the analysis reported here, the 175 individual firm locationstrategies (variables) were reduced to just 10 components that are interpretedas common location strategies. Of these 10 components, two were interpreted asrepresenting the core formation of economic globalization (Taylor et al. 2013b),
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and were statistically much more important than the others, between themaccounting for 40 percent of the common variance found in the service valuesmatrix. We concentrate on these two common location strategies here.
The characteristics of principal components can be discerned from theircomponent scores on the objects of the analysis, in this case the cities. The scoresfor the two main components identified above, illustrating the two leadingcommon location strategies from the 2010 service values matrix, are given inTable 2. These strategies are labeled intensive and extensive globalizations forreasons that will become apparent as we describe them. In each case we identifya ‘home-region’ on which the strategy is centered – most of the headquarters ofthe firms that constitute each component are to be found here (see Taylor et al.2013b, Table 3) – and a ‘global outreach’ that identifies how the rest of the worldis serviced through the location strategy. In both cases, we find the home-regionencompasses U.S. cities plus London – we have coined the term USAL to describethis global-regional formation (Taylor et al. 2013b). However, althoughoverlapping, the constitution of these two regions is quite distinctive: in the firstlist in Table 2 there are 12 U.S. cities plus London, in the second just three U.S.cities plus London. With global outreach, we find the obverse: just six cities in thefirst list but with 33 featuring in the second list. The reason for their specificlabels is as follows. The intensive globalization strategy focuses on the primelocus through which economic globalization was initially constructed (USAL)with the rest of the world serviced through just three key cities in each of thetwo other major ‘globalization arenas’ – Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris in WesternEurope and Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Beijing in Pacific Asia. In contrast, theextensive globalization strategy emanates from just four main USAL citiescombined with a very comprehensive servicing across the rest of the world: thetop five cities in the global outreach are from regions beyond USAL, WesternEurope, and Pacific Asia (the latter two regions are represented, but primarily bytheir less important cities such as Athens and Kuala Lumpur).
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In what follows, we use results from the two globalization strategies to try andunderstand the findings from the previous city-dyad analysis, specifically togeneralize beyond the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast.
Identifying Strategic Networks and Strategic Places
In our model, it is the firms that are the agents of globalization, the transnationalnetwork makers, and therefore to comprehend strategy, we start by identifyingstrategic firms and then use them to find the strategic places that are our initialconcern in this article.
Although the two components are orthogonal (i.e., not related, their correlationequals 0), there will be specific firms that use elements of both commonstrategies as reflected in their loadings on the two components. These are thefirms we will identify as ‘global strategic firms’. Specifically, we use firms’component loadings on (i.e., levels of correlations with) the intensive andextensive globalization strategies to define a ‘global strategic measure’ for all175 firms in our data. We compute the product of the loadings on the twocomponents for each firm to create this measure. Global strategic firms are thenidentified as those with a measure of 0.10 and above. The basic reasoning behindthis procedure is to find firms with relatively high positive loadings on bothcomponents. Thus, firms with a negative loading on one of the components areimmediately eliminated. Firms scoring high on one component but not the otherare similarly discarded: even with a rare high loading on 0.8 on a component, afirm would require a loading of at least 0.125 on the other component to reach ameasure of 0.10. In a more balanced case, a firm loading 0.33 on bothcomponents would similarly just qualify. The results of this exercise are shownin Table 3, where 25 global strategic firms are listed.
We can see from Table 3 that law is the sector with most strategic firms, nine intotal which is 36 percent of law firms in the data. Management consulting witheight firms (32 percent) and advertising with five firms (20 percent) make up
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the bulk of the remaining strategic firms. In complete contrast, the category offinancial services has only three of the firms listed, which is just 4 percent offinancial firms in the data. There are no accounting firms at all that are identifiedas being strategic. The dearth of firms in these latter two sectors is consistentwith the insight drawn from the APS internationalization literature reviewedearlier: the ubiquitous presence strategies of the big accounting and financialservices firms result in their office networks mostly being excluded inoperationalizing measurement of strategicness. In addition, geographic exclusionin this selection of firms in Table 3 is even more extreme: apart from a singleLondon firm, all the firms are U.S. firms (i.e., in our previous parlance, they are allfrom USAL).
We are now in a position to identify which cities are strategic places within theworld city network: we define these as cities that house offices of 10 or more ofthe strategic firms identified in the analytical step outlined above. This producesa list of 46 cities shown in Table 4.2 The cities are ranked by their strategicnetwork connectivity derived from computing the network connectivity definedby equation (2) but only including the 25 strategic firms in the calculations. Mostof the cities Sassen (1991) mentions as ‘global cities’ appear in the top half of thistable, with the cities she focuses on being ranked first (New York), second(London), and tenth (Tokyo). From our previous discussion, we can immediatelynote that Frankfurt (thirteenth) ranks higher than Dubai (eighteenth) supportingour preliminary suggestion that the former was more strategically placed in theworld city network than the latter. We can now see that this finding is largely onaccount of Frankfurt attracting more strategic firms than Dubai: 20 to 15. All 25strategic firms are found in London and New York; the latter is ranked higherbecause its offices tend to be more important than London’s (e.g., moreheadquarters): this is shown by the higher connectivity New York obtains from
2 It should be noted that although this methodology includes arbitrary thresholddecisions for defining strategic firms and strategic places, these were not the only onestested in the research. The key point is that the different choices had very little effect onsubsequent analysis. In other words, the results we present below are quite robust, withminor differences having no relevance to the conclusions drawn.
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its strategic firms’ offices. Other cities with high connectivity per strategic firmoffice are Miami, just above New York, and Johannesburg and Düsseldorf, justbelow New York. All three of these cities are specialist regional centers withimportant extramural functions (e.g., continental-scale regional headquarters).
Relating Strategic Network Connectivity to Global Network Connectivity
We have regressed strategic network connectivity against global networkconnectivity and recorded the residuals. These are standardized (0 mean and astandard deviation of 1) so that positive numbers indicate relative strategicoverconnectedness, and negative numbers indicate relative strategicunderconnectedness. In Table 5, cities are ranked by size of their residuals toshow the importance of their strategic connectivity relative to overallconnectivity.
The follow findings from this analysis are highlighted:
 There is a clear difference between New York and London: the former isthe most overconnected city relative to its global status, whereas Londonis actually underconnected and ranks a lowly twenty-sixth. It is unusual toshow these two cities so starkly separated in studies of world or globalcities.
 Other leading U.S. cities are also ranked high on this relative measuretaking ranks 2 through 5. Note that this does not include Washington, DC(only ranked seventeenth), despite its importance to U.S. law firms. Thisconfirms our measure of strategicness is more than simply reflecting thegeography of law firm networks.
 But the really interesting U.S. city in this analysis is Palo Alto, CA. Rankeda lowly two hundred sixty-third in global network connectivity, it has byfar the highest proportion of this connectivity that is strategic (an outlierat 16 percent, the other cities range from 7 percent to 11 percent of their
18
overall connectivity being strategic). This creates a ranking of fourth inTable 5; it obviously reflects its special positionality in Silicon Valley.
 Although Chinese cities are increasingly important in terms of globalnetwork connectivity, this is not being reflected in strategicness – onlyShanghai is recorded as strategically overconnected but barely so.However their respective order – Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong – isinteresting, especially in separating Shanghai from Hong Kong.
 Among cities from other erstwhile ‘third world’ countries, these aregenerally underconnected: Buenos Aires, Delhi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,Mexico City, Mumbai, and São Paulo all have large negative residuals, withthe latter being the highest ranked at only thirty-first.
 The exception to the above is Johannesburg, which is highlyoverconnected in strategicness and is ranked eleventh overall. Thispresumably reflects the city’s positionality with regards to extractingAfrican raw materials.
 And finally we can note that earlier observations about the contrastbetween Dubai and Frankfurt are confirmed here: the former isexcessively underconnected for strategicness, ranked next to last,whereas Frankfurt is strongly overconnected (ranked twelfth).
This strategic network geography that we have uncovered within the world citynetwork is shown in Figure 1; it forms the basis of our specific interpretations ofstrategic places and their differences below.
Interpretation of Positionalities: Disentangling NYLON and More
The quantitative findings shown in Table 5 and represented in Figure 1 requireinterpretation based upon both theoretical extensions of the model employedand empirical knowledge of the cities as APS centers. In practice these two needscannot be separated (and this is particularly the case when we try andcomprehend our results on New York and London). However, in terms of theempirics, clearly we cannot deal with all 46 cities, and therefore we proceed as
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follows. We begin with consideration of London and New York, surely theworld’s most studied cities, and focus on writings that have discussed theirdifferences. In addition, our interpretation takes in Castells’ (1996) specificationof his spaces of flows from which our model derives. We then deploy what wehave learned from this prime city-dyad comparison to other specific cases. Theseare chosen from a mixture of intrinsic interest and availability of relevantliterature to meet our needs: we present vignettes dealing with Beijing, HongKong and Shanghai; Palo Alto; Mexico City; Johannesburg; and conclude byreturning to the contrast between Dubai and Frankfurt.
London and New YorkLondon and New York define the only city-dyad that actually has a name:NYLON. It is part of a tradition that sees these cities at the forefront of fashionand that has been enhanced by economic globalization, whereby leading worldmovers and shakers are said to work through three offices, one in each city andanother in transit over the Atlantic. Smith (2012, 421) describes how these twocities have come to be viewed as a single city: ‘a transatlantic metropolis that isthe heart-beat of the global economy’. The key point that Smith makes is that thecities operate in conjunction for the benefit of a small rich minority. But theconflation of the two cities hides the differences that we are seeking. Theircomplementarities are based upon dissimilarity, and this has been the subject ofa careful comparison as global financial centers by Sassen (1999) and Wójcik(2013).
According to Sassen (1999, 81) New York and London constitute ‘a cooperativedivision of labor’ that operates as follows:
1. ‘London is the preeminent city for global finance today, in good part dueto numerous international firms that have located key operations andresources in the City [so that] London’s unique denationalizedplatform for global operations gives it its competitive advantage’(Sassen 1999, 83-84);
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2. But ‘what London lacks is Wall Street’s brilliant financial engineering’ andtherefore ‘New York dominates in another way by offering marketinnovations and new financial products. Wall street – still the SiliconValley of finance – has made U.S. investment firms leaders in theglobal market’ (Sassen 1999, 83-84).
More than a decade later it seems that this differentiation is still very much inplace; Wójcik (2013), in a new survey but also drawing on Strange (1997) andMichie (2006), describes it this way:
‘While New York commands access to the largest and most liquiddomestic financial market in the world, London’s physical, political andhistorical geography implies access to a different time zone, Europeanmarkets, and global connections … Taking advantage of its sheer liquiddomestic market, and the deepest pool of financial engineering talent,New York leads financial innovation... Hedge funds come from the [UnitedStates], and so do venture capital and private equity. Most new productsand methods of trading in the global securities markets emanated fromNew York…. London, in turn, has specialized as a centre, where financialfirms (with US banks in the lead) adapt financial innovation from the[United States] to foreign and international markets.’ (Wójcik 2013, 2741-2742)
The message is clear: London is particularly good for global financial business;New York is particularly good for global financial innovations.
These key differences between New York and London in the world city networkcan be equated with Castells (1996, 413) distinction between hubs and nodes inhis space of flows:
‘Some places are exchangers, communication hubs playing a role ofcoordination for the smooth interaction of all the elements integrated intothe network. Other places are the nodes of the network, that is the
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location of strategically important functions that build a series of locality-based activities and organizations around a key function in the network’
In these terms, London appears more ‘hub-like’ through integrating business(something the reforms of Big Bang in the late 1980s were explicitly designed tofacilitate), while New York is more ‘node-like’ in building new functions, thelatter interpreted as being more strategic. Further, there is a sense in whichLondon is ‘used’ with New York firms as key ‘users’, indicating a hierarchicalelement in the cities’ complementarities that Sassen (1999, 81) recognized (seealso Wall and Knaap 2011). And returning to her essential ‘global city’ process(Sassen 1991), where the city is both a market for and a producer of APSs, wecan view the relationship between these two functions as variable across cities:high levels of new production relative to market (exchange) is a distinctivestrategic place process, more focus on market service than production is ageneral network process. Indeed, we can see just such a distinction in thestrategies of internationalizing US law firms. In the initial years at least, thesefirms primarily practiced U.S. (and New York specifically) law in London as partof a strategy designed to exploit the demand for advice about the structuring offinancial transactions using New York law (Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson2002; Warf 2001). Such an interpretation provides both an explanation for ourresults, showing New York exhibiting more strategicness than London, and alsosuggests a general means of comparing cities in the world city network in termsof their relative strategicness.
Beijing, Hong Kong, and ShanghaiTo illustrate the latter, we can turn briefly to the China cities in our analysisusing Lai’s (2012) study of the mutualities between Beijing, Hong Kong, andShanghai as financial centers. She describes a ‘dual headquarter strategy’ forBeijing-Shanghai relations and ‘parallel markets’ for Hong Kong-Shanghairelations. Although she equates Hong Kong’s role with that of New York (Lai2012), if we move analysis from city-dyad to city-triad a rather different pictureobtains.
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The roles of the three China cities are quite distinctive. Beijing is the politicalcenter, ‘responsible for policy-making and macro planning’ (Lai 2012, 1283), inother words, the locus of command and control. Shanghai, on the other hand, ‘istasked with testing new products, developing new markets and financialinnovation’ (Lai 2012, 1283). The result is that Shanghai has ‘the highestconcentration of foreign banks’ and hosts ‘new financial markets in futures,derivatives and foreign exchange’ (Lai 2012, 1283). In contrast Hong Kong hasgrown as a strategic conduit ‘connecting global capital and China’ (Lai 2012,1275) and continues in the role of China’s ‘offshore financial centre.’ (Lai 2012,1275).
It takes very little imagination to equate this structural logic to similar relationsbetween Washington as political center, New York as innovative center, andLondon as offshore center. In the latter case, both London and Hong Kong haveexploited a political autonomy by being outside the directsovereign/administrative control of the United States and China, respectively. Inother words, these are necessary global platforms where you can do things thatare not possible in the cities of the United States and mainland China.
Our analysis adds weight to this city-triad comparison. In Table 5, the threeChina cities appear ranked in the same sequence as the USAL cities: New Yorkand Shanghai are relatively most strategic, with London and Hong Kong least,and Washington and Beijing in between. London and Hong Kong, in particular,have very similar levels of relatively low strategicness.
Palo AltoAs the main city in Silicon Valley, Palo Alto is a very special strategic place, asreflected in our analysis through its unusual combination of very low generalintegration into the world city network with very high strategicness. How doesthe production of high tech innovations that Silicon Valley is famous for transferinto APS innovation as our results imply? This special place has distinctiveservicing needs that have led to specialization in deal making, advising new firmstart-ups and university spin-offs, arranging access to venture capital, taking
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successful firms public, plus mergers and acquisitions activity (Lashinsky 2002;Reiffenstein 2009). The main sector providing these services is law and lawfirms, working as ‘patent attorneys’ in particular and facilitating innovationexploitation. Specifically, according to Reiffenstein (2009, 572), law firms ‘bymediating between the private interests of firms and the public concerns of thepatent office, perform a critical role that is not merely ancillary but instrumentalto the workings of the knowledge economy’. In other words, these law firms arepart of the technology community (Reiffenstein 2009). In terms similar to thoseused to describe New York’s role in finance, Reiffenstein quotes Friedman et al.(1989) as saying that ‘the Silicon Valley lawyer not only works with engineers,he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer – a legal engineer’ (Reiffenstein 2009,578). Thus
‘Silicon Valley occupies a special place in this [patent] system. Itsattorneys are the “engineers” of business and legal precedent particularlyas it relates to the translation of science to industry. Firms located thereenjoy a locational advantage from a proximity to milieus of basic andapplied research: buyers and sellers of technology’ (Reiffenstein 2009,580).
This special place is a strategic place because ‘every one of the major SiliconValley law offices is a component of a much larger branch network’ (Reiffenstein2009, 579) enabling the firm ‘to link buyers and sellers of technology and tolubricate the innovative process by linking places’ (Reiffenstein 2009, 580), nownecessarily including ‘international transactions’ (Lashinsky 2002). Thus, PaloAlto is only a small city, but it is a big player in the strategy of law firms andtherefore the world city network as our strategicness analyses have shown.
Mexico CityMexico City is strongly integrated into the world city network (in the top 20listed in Table 1), but according to our analyses it is relatively underconnectedstrategically (Table 5). We use Parnreiter’s (2010) study of how APS firms in
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Mexico City operate in global commodity chains to interpret our findings in thiscase.
Parnreiter (2010) begins by asking the crucial question, does the APS sector inMexico City function as merely an enabling agent of economic globalization, ordo these firms help shape the nature of the production networks they areservicing? To answer the question, he finds he has to break with Sassen’s (1991,43) ‘equating the management of the world economy with its control’. These aretwo separate mechanisms that are ‘frequently conflated’ despite the fact that
‘it is questionable whether all high-wage, high-tech and high-profitservices necessary for running global production processes are actuallyrelated to decision-making. This question is particularly relevant to globalcities in non-core countries, which have a sizeable producer service sectorbut are normally not considered to host decision-making capacities’(Sassen 1992, 44).
Thus, although many of the practitioners he interviewed emphasize theimportance of their local office within the world city network, Parnreiter is ableto show that this is largely necessary work but not strategic work. He concludes
‘Though at first glance it seems that the networks of producer servicefirms are rather flat, their organizational model implies that there is thechain of command. Despite the fact that the local cooperation is … seen as… essential to do business, the “big” strategies are made by the leadpartners [and] the number of lead partners an office of a global serviceprovider can have depends … by and large on the geography ofheadquarters of TNCs. Since there are far fewer companies with origins inMexico that compete successfully in the world market than foreign firmsin Mexico, the Mexico City offices of accountancy, legal or real estate firmswill not often be in command’ (Parnreiter 2010, 47).
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This is entirely consistent with our finding on the differences between MexicoCity’s global network connectivity and its strategic network connectivity. It alsodirectly corresponds with the example presented above in our review of the APSliterature in which the executive search firm Korn/Ferry uses a hybrid strategyto service Mexico City rather than the owned form used in the most strategicplaces.
Since Parnreiter frames his argument in world-systems terms, we are invited toextrapolate this interpretation to other important cities from ‘non-corecountries’: from Table 5 and Figure 1 this would include São Paulo, Jakarta,Buenos Aires, Kuala Lumpur, Delhi, and Mumbai. But not all cities from non-corecountries are strategically underconnected.
JohannesburgBangkok and Johannesburg are the exceptions to Parnreiter’s argument in ouranalyses (Table 5 and Figure 1). In the case of the latter, we use Surborg’s (2011,325) study that employs positionality as his ‘point of departure’ and treats ‘citiesin the third world for what they are: places occupying a very specific position inthe world economy, each one of them a unique place’ (Surborg, 2011, 326).
Drawing on Rogerson (2005), Surborg (2011) provides hints at what is uniqueabout Johannesburg that may have enabled it to be more strategic than expectedin a world of ‘uneven connections’. Put simply, in the postapartheid era,‘Johannesburg’s experience was different from most other major cities insouthern Africa because South Africa’s liberalisation of its economy was largely aresult of domestic policy, while that of other countries … was usually the result ofexternally enforced structural adjustment policies’ (Surborg 2011, 324). Beyondhis African comparisons, we can note that this posited relative autonomy can bealso contrasted with Mexico City ‘trapped’, as it were, in the North America FreeTrade Association (NAFTA).3 Both Johannesburg and Mexico City can be
3 The fact that Toronto, the only Canadian city to be included in our 46 strategic places,is ranked bottom in Table 5 does clearly suggest that NAFTA has tended to work for the
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designated ‘gateway cities’ linking ‘national “investment opportunities” to globalcircuits of capital’ (Surborg 2011, 319) but whereas Parnreiter (2010, 50)concludes that Mexico City operates as ‘a “bridgehead” for the interests of thedominant centres of the world economy’, Johannesburg’s recent trajectory mayhave encompassed more autonomy in the world economy for its economic elitesresulting in the city’s ‘specific position’ being more strategic in the world citynetwork.4
A note of caution has to be inserted here. We do not have anywhere near thequality of evidence upon which Parnreiter (2010) based his Mexico City researchfor our understanding of Johannesburg in the world city network. The review ofwork on APSs also suggests that, in some cases, Johannesburg’s strategicnessrelates to the future, exemplifying the way key cities are emerging that are at theheart of the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and now South Africa).Thus, at this time, ideas about the reasons for Johannesburg’s strategicpositioning remain in the realm of speculation. Our findings for this city suggestfurther research is needed to pinpoint the mechanism attracting strategic APSfirms to Johannesburg.
Dubai and FrankfurtFinally, we return to Dubai and Frankfurt, whose alleged differences instrategicness (Table 1) first stimulated this research. The disparity between
benefit of APS firms in leading U.S. cities at the expense of their Canadian and Mexicancounterparts.4 For recent examples of two of our ‘strategic firms’, see ‘New Johannesburg Office: AGateway to Africa for Canadian Mining Companies’ athttp://emailcc.com/rv/ff000884c0cfb0734ec2b80e1d49beb856820713 (accessedSeptember 1, 2012), and see ‘Bain & Company expands Financial Services practice inSouth Africa’ where it is announced that ‘We are growing our team of financialspecialists at a time of global challenges and unique opportunities for South Africa’sleading players’ at http://www.bain.com/about/press/press-releases/bain-and-company-expands-financial-services-practice-in-south-africa.aspx (accessed September1, 2012).
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these cities is a clear case of contrasting positionalities. Frankfurt’s relativelyhigh strategic importance results from its established position as Germany’sleading financial center and major hub for specialist business services that haslong served as the primary – though not exclusive (see Düsseldorf’s and Munich’sposition in Table 5; Hoyler 2011) – gateway to Europe’s largest economy fortransnational firms, particularly those originating in the United States (Grote2008; Hoyler, Freytag, and Mager 2008). Dubai, however, has recently beendescribed as merely a gateway to itself (Bassens 2013). This intriguingexplanation of the remarkable rise of Dubai as a ‘global city’ requires explication.
The residuals of our regression analysis suggest that Dubai is, indeed, one of theleast strategic places in the world city network: it is ranked forty-fifth out of 46cities. Bassens (2013) argues that the city’s extensive connectivity in the officenetworks of APS firms does not imply that it is a global city in the full, rich senseof ‘strategic sites’ as put forward by Sassen (1991). Based on, inter alia, ananalysis of how and why London-based financial services firms have becomeinvolved in Dubai, Bassens concludes that Dubai is, above all, seen as a site ofopportunity by these firms (i.e., a market in itself for speculative surplusgeneration for regional and global capital):
‘(T)he growth of Dubai has been mostly financed by UK investments or atleast has been channeled through the UK, via a growing array of funds,asset management, banks, and other financial service firms in The City ofLondon. Part of these investment may very well originate in the GulfRegion itself but have been recycled and re-imported in the region, aprocess mostly mediated by banks based in The City, which have a longbusiness history in the Gulf.’ (Bassens 2013)
Many financial services firms have an office in Dubai, which has thus become awell-connected APS cluster because it ‘controls’ access to its urban investmentcategories, which are mainly real estate markets and large infrastructureprojects. Hence, Bassens (2013) suggests that Dubai should be viewed as whathe calls a ‘gateway global city’, not to a region as Mexico City does for Mexico and
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Frankfurt does for Germany, but mainly to itself. In line with the ‘strategicness’ ofcities for APS firms as described in our literature review, Dubai is well-connectedin the office networks of APS firms, but a presence there is not strategicallyimportant.
Conclusion
This article has added to our knowledge of the contemporary world city networkby going beyond the basic measurement of global network connectivities toshow a distinctive pattern of strategic network connectivities. Our findingsappear credible and have been shown to link with literatures on selectedindividual cities and with work on APSs and their strategic city location decisionsand organizational forms. There are, of course, caveats to bear in mind whenassessing these results overall.
 We have not produced definitive strategic places, but rather specificstrategic places relating to one economic sector, APSs. We do argue theparticular importance of this sector for economic globalization, but therewill be other strategic places for global commodity chains defined byother criteria (Goerzen et al. 2013).
 We have provided a cross-sectional analysis for 2010 to define citypositionalities, but, of course, these are inherently historical; informationon city trajectories is a necessary addition to make better sense of ourresults.
 The latter point is very relevant to the fact we have used two U.S.-based(with London) location strategies of firms as the basis of the analysis,selected from 10 identified global location strategies. This choice wasjustified by their being both the most important strategies identified andbecause they are from the world region that largely generated economicglobalization. However it is their recent history and present that are beingdesignated ‘most important’; but this designation may be less relevant forthe future in a dynamic world economy: Pacific Asian, especially China,
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location strategies will have their own emerging strategic places that ourmethodology is not designed to find.
What we have been able to do is provide some order in an increasingly complexeconomy through excavating strategic places within world city networkstructures. In this way, we present an extensive picture in which to view themechanisms of contemporary economic globalization.
We began with Sassen’s (1991) ‘global cities’ as new strategic places that havesolved the problem of providing operational capacity in a new global economy.Although restricting ourselves to ‘spatial’ identification of the strategic, thisconcept has still emerged as a multifarious mix of processes. In particular, ourstrategic places appear to have various combinations of command capacity andgeneration of innovations with APS firms that develop strategic presence,internationalization policies choosing to operate in these, but not other, cities toaccess such qualities. Strategic cities are, then, those that develop a reciprocalrelationship between globally significant agglomeration and localizationeconomies and APS firms; the latter needing to access but also helping(re)produce the former (Bathelt et al. 2004; Cook et al. 2007 Faulconbridge et al.2011). In contrast APS firms with ubiquitous strategies maintain a presence inboth strategic cities and less strategic cities that act as local market nodes. In thisway we have interwoven the two key points we identified in Sheppard’s (2002)geographic positionality: mutualities between the local and the nonlocal, andpower relations within networks. Power in a world-city-as-strategic-place isrepresented overtly as command but also more covertly through innovationcreating monopoly. But this power only has meaning through its deploymentacross networks involving other cities, both highly strategic and less so. Thesetwo features of positionality have been most clearly articulated through thecontrasting interpretations of London and New York in this research.
It is, therefore, appropriate that we finish with a further comment on comparingLondon and New York, and we will do this by considering what spatialstrategicness means for the futures of these two archetypal global cities. One
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implication of strategy is that it is long term as opposed to tactical andoperational. This suggests that in the aggregate, the more strategic a place, themore resilient it should be. Translated to global cities, this means New York islikely to be more resilient than London in an increasingly dynamic worldeconomy. But we have also disaggregated strategicness in terms of what theirdifferent levels actually mean, and this points to a quite different interpretation:the basic feature distinguishing New York’s strategicness from London’s is theformer’s leadership in service innovation. This appears to broadly work as NewYork generating innovations, which are then widely applied in London for globalconsumption. Thus, the economic success of the two global cities appears toparallel Jacobs’ (1969, 39) ‘two master economic processes’: new work throughinnovation in city economies, and diffusion of new work by import replacementin city economies. Clearly while global city New York is a case of the former, wecan add that global city London is a case of the latter. The key point is thatinnovation is more complex but far less common than import replacement (assimpler imitation and adaption). It might well be that if the dynamism of theworld economy does precipitate a move in the center of gravity eastwards, ascommonly predicted, then New York’s strategic innovation character may be lessresilient than London’s strategic imitation character: probably new workthrough other’s innovations (from wherever) will be easier to sustain thanspecific, local innovative activity itself. In this argument London can better adaptto Western relative decline as the world’s most resilient global city.
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Table 1 Frequency of Leading Dyad Partners of the Top 20 Cities
Global Network
Connectivity
Rank City
Number of
top 40 dyad-
partners
1 London 9
2 New York 10
3 Hong Kong 8
4 Paris 6
5 Singapore 8
6 Tokyo 6
7 Shanghai 8
8 Chicago 3
9 Dubai 0
10 Sydney 1
11 Milan 0
12 Beijing 6
13 Toronto 0
14 São Paulo 0
15 Madrid 1
16 Mumbai 0
17 Los Angeles 4
18 Moscow 0
19 Frankfurt 7
20 Mexico City 0
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Table 2 Intensive and Extensive Globalization
INTENSIVE Scores EXTENSIVE Scores
Home-region Home-region
New York 4.80 New York 2.21
Chicago 4.31 Chicago 1.90
Washington 3.86 London 1.59
London 3.73 San Francisco 0.84
Los Angeles 3.29
San Francisco 2.59 Global outreach
Palo Alto 2.18 Johannesburg 1.51
Boston 1.56 Mexico City 1.50
Philadelphia 1.38 Istanbul 1.49
Houston 1.36 Sydney 1.46
Dallas 0.97 Dubai 1.44
Pittsburgh 0.96 Kuala Lumpur 1.43
Atlanta 0.73 Athens 1.42
Buenos Aires 1.38
Global outreach Toronto 1.26
Brussels 1.48 Copenhagen 1.11
Frankfurt 1.11 Santiago 1.11
Paris 1.04 Mumbai 1.08
Hong Kong 0.81 Lima 1.06
Tokyo 0.68 Paris 1.06
Beijing 0.68 Manila 1.04
Caracas 0.99
Beirut 0.98
Cairo 0.94
Warsaw 0.90
Milan 0.90
Amsterdam 0.90
Bucharest 0.89
Lisbon 0.88
Moscow 0.87
Taipei 0.87
Tel Aviv 0.85
Stockholm 0.85
Kiev 0.81
Madrid 0.80
Vienna 0.75
Seoul 0.72
Barcelona 0.69
Jakarta 0.68Component scores are derived from a principal components analysis in which 10components were extracted and rotated using varimax criteria – for moredetails, see Taylor et al. (2013).
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Table 3 Global Strategic Firms
APS firm Globalstrategic
measure Sector Headquarters
Sidley Austin 0.16 Law Chicago
Kirkland & Ellis 0.15 Law Chicago
ZS Associates 0.15 Management consulting Chicago
Wunderman 0.14 Advertising New York
Dewey & LeBoeuf 0.14 Law New York
A.T. Kearney 0.14 Management consulting Chicago
The Boston Consulting Group 0.13 Management consulting Boston
McKinsey & Company 0.13 Management consulting New York
NERA Economic Consulting 0.12 Management consulting New York
Monitor Group 0.12 Advertising Boston
DDB Worldwide 0.12 Advertising New York
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 0.12 Law Los Angeles
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 0.12 Law New York
McDermott Will & Emery National 0.11 Law Chicago
Booz & Company 0.11 Management consulting New York
Bain & Company 0.11 Management consulting Boston
Goldman Sachs Group 0.11 Financial New York
Sullivan & Cromwell 0.11 Law New York
Baker & McKenzie 0.11 Law Chicago*
L.E.K. Consulting 0.11 Management consulting London
Saatchi and Saatchi 0.11 Advertising New York
Morgan Stanley 0.10 Financial New York
TBWA Worldwide 0.10 Advertising New York
Latham & Watkins 0.10 Law Los Angeles*
Wells Fargo 0.10 Financial San Francisco
* Original (first) office, the firm claims to operate without a headquarters.
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Table 4 Strategic Network Connectivity
Rank City
Strategic
network
connectivity
Number
of offices
Connectivity
per office
1 New York 10951 25 438.04
2 London 9316 25 372.64
3 Chicago 7629 24 317.88
4 Paris 7023 22 319.23
5 Hong Kong 6744 20 337.20
6 San Francisco 6484 24 270.17
7 Los Angeles 6325 23 275.00
8 Sydney 6219 18 345.50
9 Singapore 6126 17 360.35
10 Tokyo 6110 22 277.73
11 Shanghai 6019 23 261.70
12 Milan 5731 19 301.63
13 Frankfurt 5613 20 280.65
14 Beijing 5581 22 253.68
15 Moscow 5201 17 305.94
16 Miami 5040 11 458.18
17 São Paulo 4994 15 332.93
18 Dubai 4937 15 329.13
19 Bangkok 4766 13 366.62
20 Washington 4748 19 249.89
21 Madrid 4714 17 277.29
22 Johannesburg 4460 11 405.45
23 Düsseldorf 4451 11 404.64
24 Toronto 4445 15 296.33
25 Mumbai 4394 13 338.00
26 Mexico City 4343 13 334.08
27 Dallas 4327 12 360.58
28 Buenos Aires 4132 12 344.33
29 Amsterdam 4128 11 375.27
30 Jakarta 4118 11 374.36
31 Stockholm 4079 12 339.92
32 Melbourne 4061 14 290.07
33 Seoul 4052 13 311.69
34 Kuala Lumpur 4035 10 403.50
35 Munich 4002 15 266.80
36 Auckland 3952 10 395.20
37 Brussels 3846 14 274.71
38 Taipei 3790 11 344.55
39 Boston 3712 14 265.14
40 Warsaw 3630 10 363.00
41 Zurich 3562 12 296.83
42 Riyadh 3547 12 295.58
43 Rome 3475 13 267.31
44 Delhi 3412 12 284.33
45 Houston 3255 13 250.38
46 Palo Alto 2385 12 198.75
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Table 5 Residuals from Regressing Strategic Network Connectivity againstGlobal Network Connectivity
Rank City Residual
1 New York 2.53
2 San Francisco 2.36
3 Chicago 2.26
4 Palo Alto 1.51
5 Los Angeles 1.36
6 Bangkok 0.98
7 Auckland 0.93
8 Düsseldorf 0.92
9 Miami 0.79
10 Riyadh 0.78
11 Johannesburg 0.74
12 Frankfurt 0.74
13 Paris 0.63
14 Stockholm 0.48
15 Sydney 0.47
16 Dallas 0.26
17 Washington 0.24
18 Milan 0.11
19 Shanghai 0.01
20 Tokyo 0.00
21 Moscow -0.01
22 Beijing -0.02
23 Rome -0.26
24 Munich -0.27
25 Taipei -0.29
26 London -0.31
27 Hong Kong -0.32
28 Melbourne -0.40
29 Houston -0.43
30 Singapore -0.45
31 São Paulo -0.47
32 Boston -0.58
33 Warsaw -0.67
34 Jakarta -0.76
35 Madrid -0.77
36 Buenos Aires -0.90
37 Mexico City -0.92
38 Zurich -0.95
39 Seoul -0.96
40 Kuala Lumpur -0.99
41 Amsterdam -1.12
42
42 Delhi -1.13
43 Mumbai -1.18
44 Brussels -1.22
45 Dubai -1.24
46 Toronto -1.50
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Figure 1 The strategicness of major cities in the world city network
